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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
KHALID KHAWAR,

)
)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

)
)

V.

)
)

GLOBE INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

)
)

Defendant and Petitioner

)

___________________________________________ )

RESPONDENT'S ANSWER BRIEF ON THE MERITS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
On March 31, 1990, Khalid Khawar filed an amended complaint
for defamation against Globe International, Inc., Roundtable
Publishing, publisher of a book entitled The Senator Must Die:
The Murder of Robert F, Kennedy, and Robert Morrow, author of
that book.

(C.T. 141, 137.)

The suit alleged that Defendants

had defamed Mr. Khawar by accusing him of conspiring, in June of
1968, to assassinate Robert F. Kennedy.

(C.T. 138.)

Mr. Khawar

alleged that Globe published an article and accompanying
photograph depicting Mr. Khawar as Senator Kennedy's assassin.
(C.T. 139.)

Globe's article, published in April, 1989, was

predicated on Morrow's book.

(C.T. 139.)

Prior to trial, Mr.

Khawar reached a settlement with Roundtable Publishing and a

1

default judgment was entered against Robert Morrow.
V.

See Khawar

Globe Int'l. Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 14, 21 (1996) .
At trial, the jury found in favor of Mr. Khawar and against

Globe.

(C.T. 2781-83.)

The jury awarded Mr. Khawar punitive

damages of $500,000 and compensatory damages of $675,000.
2783, 91.)

The judgment was entered on April 15, 1994.

(C.T.
(C.T.

3110. )
Globe filed a timely notice of appeal.

(C.T. 3130.)

The

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety, finding
(1) Mr. Khawar was a private figure;

(2) there was substantial

evidence to support the jury's findings that Globe published the
article with malice;

(3) California had not adopted the neutral

reportage privilege with respect to private figures; and (4)
Globe was liable for defamation for republishing a defamatory
statement.

See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 14-15.

This Court granted review on September 25, 1996.
Statement of Facts
On June 4, 1968, Respondent Mr. Khawar, an amateur
photojournalist for a Pakistani publication, was at the
Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles.

(R.T. 1336.)

Mr. Khawar was

photographing Senator Kennedy, who had just won the California
primary.

(R.T. 2735.)

When Senator Kennedy left the podium and

proceeded to the pantry area of the Ambassador hotel, Mr. Khawar
remained on the podium to reload his camera.

2

(R.T. 2735, 1341.)

A gunman in the pantry area assassinated Senator Kennedy while
Mr. Khawar remained on the podium.

(R.T. 2735.)

Police

prevented Mr. Khawar from entering the pantry area.
1341.)

(R.T.

A review of the investigations undertaken by the Los

Angeles Police Department and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation provides no indication that Mr. Khawar was present
in the pantry area at the time of the assassination.

{R.T.

702 . )
In November, 1988, twenty years after the assassination of
Senator Kennedy, Morrow authored a book entitled The Senator
Must Die: The Murder of Robert F. Kennedy.
book was published by Roundtable Publishing.

(C.T. 138.)

The

(C.T. 138.)

In

the book. Morrow alleged that the Iranian Secret Police had
conspired with the Mafia to assassinate Senator Kennedy.
143-73.)

(C.T.

Morrow named Mr. Khawar (referred to as “Ali Ahmand"

and "Khalid Iqbal" in the book) as the true assassin of Senator
Kennedy.

(C.T. 143-73; R.T. 1123.)

Morrow's book included

pictures of Mr. Khawar standing near Senator Kennedy on the
night of the assassination.

(C.T. 143-73.)

In April of 1989, a former employee of Mr. Khawar told him
that he had seen Mr. Khawar's picture in a magazine.
1357.)

(R.T.

Mr. Khawar subsequently discovered that on April 4,

1989, Globe had published an article with the heading "Former
CIA agent claims: IRANIANS KILLED BOBBY KENNEDY FOR THE MAFIA."

3

(Plaintiff's Exhibit B.)

An enhanced photograph of Mr. Khawar

accompanied the article.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit B.)

A

superimposed arrow pointed to Mr. Khawar, identifying him as the
Iranian agent who had used a gun disguised to look like a camera
to assassinate Senator Kennedy.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit B.)

Mr.

Khawar ignored the article and its accusations, hoping it would
be forgotten.

(R.T. 1355, 1362.)

Subsequently, however, Mr.

Khawar received several threatening phone calls and his property
was vandalized.

(R.T. 1367.)

Khawar filed this suit.

In order to clear his name, Mr.

(R.T. 1368.)

A

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Whether the court of appeal correctly decided that Mr.
Khawar is a private figure because his mere association
with Senator Kennedy's assassination is insufficient to
elevate him to the status of a public figure.

2.

Whether the jury's finding of actual malice is supported by
substantial evidence that justifies the punitive damage
award in Mr. Khawar's favor.

3.

Whether this Court should reject the neutral reportage
privilege, a defense not recognized by the Supreme
Court, in order to preserve the integrity of individual
privacy rights under the First Amendment.

5

I

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I

The court below correctly held that Mr. Khawar is neither a
general, limited purpose, nor involuntary public figure.

Mr.

Khawar's mere presence on the podium near Senator Kennedy on the
night of the assassination is not sufficient to deprive Mr.
Khawar of his status as a private individual.

This Court should

follow the rationale of the Supreme Court and find that Mr.
Khawar did not become an involuntary public figure merely
because the controversy surrounding Senator Kennedy's
assassination is of public interest.

Rather, this Court should

affirm the holding of the lower court and find that Mr. Khawar
is a private individual.
The jury's finding of actual malice is supported by
substantial evidence in the record and justifies the punitive
damage award in Mr. Khawar's favor.

The record shows that

Globe's editors possessed a subjective awareness of the probable
falsity of the article, yet published it without regard for Mr.
Khawar's reputation.

Globe's failure to confirm the defamatory

allegations made in the article, coupled with Globe's failure to
substantiate its alterations to Morrow's book, supports the
jury's finding of actual malice.

Accordingly, this Court should

affirm the award of punitive damages in Mr. Khawar's favor.
The neutral reportage privilege, argued for by Petitioner,
should not be adopted in California.

I

6

The privilege, which

focuses on the newsworthiness of a defamatory publication,
rather than the status of the individual defamed, is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's defamation analysis.

The

privilege has been explicitly rejected because it ignores the
delicate balance between societal and individual constitutional
protections.

Moreover, the privilege is contrary to public

policy because it immunizes the media from liability for
defaming innocent individuals.

Even if this Court adopts the

privilege, Globe cannot meet its burden of satisfying the four
elements required to assert the privilege.

Accordingly, this

Court should affirm the lower court's holding and find that
Globe is precluded from asserting a neutral reportage privilege
defense.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEAL CORRECTLY DECIDED THAT MR. KHAWAR IS
NEITHER A GENERAL, LIMITED PURPOSE, NOR INVOLUNTARY PUBLIC
FIGURE.
The question of whether or not a person is a public figure

involves constitutional principles of free speech and thus is a
mixed question of law and fact.
376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964).

See New York Times v. Sullivan,

The issue must be reviewed ^ novo to

ensure that constitutional principles have been properly
applied.

See id. at 285; see also, Bose v. Consumers Union of

United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).

Accordingly, the

appropriate standard of review is whether, after an independent

7

review of the record, substantial evidence supports the lower
court's decision.

Weinqarten v. Block, 102 Cal. App. 3d 129,

134-35 (1980).
This Court has observed that private individuals have less
opportunity than public officials or public figures to
effectively counteract false statements.

See Brown v_._Kelly

Broadcasting Co., 48 Cal. 3d 711, 744 (1989).

As a result of

this imbalance, private individuals are more vulnerable to
injury.

See id.

Consequently, this Court has recognized that a

"reasonable degree of protection for a private individual's
reputation is essential to our system of ordered liberty."

Jji.

To preserve private individuals' privacy and reputation, it is
essential that this Court enforce a high threshold for elevating
private individuals to public figure status.

In determining

whether individuals are public figures, this Court should
require evidence of "affirmative action by which purported
public figures have thrust themselves into the forefront of
particular public controversies."

Reader's Digest Ass'n v.

Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 244, 255 (1984).
A.

Mr. Khawar Is Not A General Or Limited Purpose Public
Figure Because He Did Not Thrust Himself To The
Forefront Of The Controversy.

Mr. Khawar is not a general public figure because he did
not achieve "such pervasive fame or notoriety that he

[became]

public figure for all purposes and in all contexts."

Gertz v.

8

a

Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).

Persons who fall

into the category of general public figure have usually "assumed
roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society."

Id. at

345. "Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society,
an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all
aspects of his life."

Id.

Mr. Khawar's very limited role in

the events surrounding the assassination of Senator Kennedy
simply does not elevate him to the status of a general public
figure.
Mr. Khawar does not conform to the description of a
limited purpose public figure.

In determining whether an

individual is either a general or a limited purpose public
figure, a court should "look to the nature and extent of an
individual's participation in the particular controversy giving
rise to the defamation."

Id. at 352.

Limited purpose public

figures are those who "have thrust themselves to the forefront
of particular public controversies in order to influence the
resolution of the issues involved."

Id. at 345.

Mr. Khawar is

not a limited purpose public figure because he did not take the
requisite affirmative action.

Accordingly, this Court should

affirm the lower court finding that Mr. Khawar was a private
individual, not a public figure.

9

Petitioner argues that Mr. Khawar's mere act of standing
near Senator Kennedy on the podium at the rally justifies
labeling him a limited purpose public figure.
however, does not support such an argument.

The case law,
An individual is

not a public figure merely because he happens to be involved in
a controversy that is newsworthy.
424 U.S. 448, 454

(1976).

See Time, Inc, v. Firestone,

In order to prove that a plaintiff

achieved limited purpose public figure status, the defendant
must show that the plaintiff voluntarily "thrust himself into
the vortex of a public issue [and engaged] the public's
attention in an attempt to influence its outcome."
U.S. at 352.

Gertz, 418

In this case, however, Mr. Khawar did not engage

in the type of affirmative action required by Gertz.
Accordingly, this Court should not elevate Mr. Khawar to the
status of a public figure.
In Gertz, the United States Supreme Court held that an
attorney was not a public figure even though his representation
of his client amounted to voluntary association with a public
controversy.

418 U.S. at 352.

Gertz was merely doing his job.

To paraphrase the Court, Mr.
See id.

Similarly, Mr. Khawar,

by attending the Kennedy rally, was simply doing his job.

Mr.

Khawar went to the rally because, as an amateur journalist for a
Pakistani newspaper and a self-proclaimed student of American
culture, he wanted to document the event.

10

(R.T. 1336.)

It is

true that Mr. Khawar positioned himself close to Senator Kennedy
for optimum photo opportunities, but it would require a great
leap for this Court to determine that this action alone
constitutes the requisite "thrusting of oneself into the vortex
of a public issue."

As Mr. Khawar stood next to Senator Kennedy

on the podium, he could not have predicted the assassination and
the controversy that would follow.
Even if this Court were to accept that Mr. Khawar's minimal
participation in the events surrounding Senator Kennedy's
assassination elevated him to a limited purpose public figure,
the passage of twenty years should negate that conclusion.

By

the time the Globe article was published in 1989, Mr. Khawar's
image had likely faded from the memories of any individuals who
might have recognized him as the "man in the yellow sweater"
that day on the podium.
Moreover, Mr. Khawar's appearance on a local television
show is not relevant to the determination of whether he is a
limited purpose public figure because it occurred after the
Globe article was published.

The United States Supreme Court

has recognized that "[t]he first remedy of any victim of
defamation is self-help; that is, the use of available
opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and
thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation."
418 U.S. at 344.

Gertz,

The Fourth Circuit has refused to "attribute

11

public figure status to otherwise private persons merely because
they responded to .

.

. accusations in a reasonable attempt to

vindicate their reputations."

Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC,

Inc., 37 F.3d 15^1, 1558 (4th Cir. 1994).

The Foretich court

followed the Gertz Court's advice to formulate "broad rules of
general application" to accommodate the competing interests of
press and personal reputation.
343).

Id.

(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at

The alternative, assessing each defendant on an ^ hoc

basis, "would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain
expectations."

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.

This Court should find

that Mr. Khawar's decision to appear on local television news
was a reasonable attempt to minimize the effects of Globe's
widely-distributed attack on his reputation.

Mr. Khawar's use

of the shield of self-help should not be used as a sword against
him.
Mr. Khawar's interaction with the press is distinguishable
from that of the plaintiff in a leading case addressing the
limited purpose public figure question.
22 Cal. App. 4th 927 (1994).

See Denney v. Lawrence,

In Denney, the court held that the

plaintiff, the brother of an accused murderer, was a limited
purpose public figure because he gave interviews to the press in
an attempt "to influence public opinion as to the circumstances
surrounding the killing and his brother's culpability, if Any,
for the homicide."

Id. at 936.

Unlike the plaintiff in Denney,

12

however, Mr. Khawar made no attempts to influence public debate.
*

Mr. Khawar's only intent in appearing on the local television
show was to rebut the

allegations in the article.

Accordingly,

this Court should find that Mr. Khawar's television appearance
does not raise him to the level of a limited purpose public
figure.
B-

The United States Supreme Court Has Rejected The Idea
That A Private Individual Can Be Transformed Into A
^blic_Figure Simply By Involuntary Involvement In, Or
Association With, A Matter Of Public Interest.

This Court should not find Mr. Khawar to be an involuntary
public figure because to do so would result in the resurrection
of a standard emphatically rejected by the United States Supreme
Court.

In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 44

(1971), the

Supreme Court held that a private individual is transformed into
a public figure whenever defamatory falsehoods concern matters
of general or public interest.

In the years since Rosenbloom,

however, the Supreme Court has consistently repudiated this
proposition.

See, e.g., Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443

U.S. 157, 167 (1979)

(holding that a private individual is not

automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming
I

involved in, or associated with, a matter that attracts public
attention); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (holding that the public or
general interest test for determining the applicability of the
New York Times standard to private defamation actions

13

inadequately serves the competing values at stake) .

This Court

should follow the current reasoning of the Supreme Court and
refuse to attribute involuntary public figure status to Mr.
Khawar merely because the controversy surrounding the
assassination of Senator Kennedy is of public interest.
In Wolston, for example, a publication referred to the
plaintiff as a Soviet spy because he failed to respond to a
grand jury subpoena in a Soviet spy investigation.
159, 162, 166.

443 U.S. at

The Court, in refusing to label the plaintiff a

public figure, stated that "it would be more accurate to say
that petitioner was dragged unwillingly into the controversy."
Id. at 166.

To label Wolston a public figure, the Court

reasoned, would reestablish the doctrine adopted in Rosenbloom
and subsequently rejected in Gertz.

See id. at 167.

"A private

individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure
just by becoming involved in a matter that attracts public
attention."

id.

Therefore, this Court should not ascribe

involuntary public figure status to Mr. Khawar simply because he
became unwillingly involved in the controversy surrounding
Senator Kennedy's assassination.
In Gertz, the Supreme Court made fleeting reference to the
possible existence of involuntary public figures.
345.

410 U.S. at

The Court acknowledged, however, that while

"hypothetically, it may be possible for someone to become a

14

public figure through no purposeful action of his own,

. .

. the

instances of truly involuntary public figures must be
exceedingly rare."

Id.

The Court did not indicate how an

individual might become an involuntary public figure.

Indeed,

the Court has not to this date actually assigned the involuntary
public figure label to any individual.

Mr. Khawar's relatively

minor involvement in the events surrounding the assassination of
Senator Kennedy, coupled with the Supreme Court's apparent
reluctance to assign involuntary public figure status, simply
does not justify the conclusion that Mr. Khawar became one of
the nebulous and rare involuntary public figures hinted at in
Gertz■
II.

THE JURY'S FINDING OF ACTUAL MALICE IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD THAT JUSTIFIES THE
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IN MR. KHAWAR'S FAVOR.
Substantial evidence in the record supports a finding by a

reasonable jury that Globe acted with actual malice.

The jury

found that Mr. Khawar proved by clear and convincing evidence
that Globe published the defamatory article either knowing that
the statements therein were false, or with reckless disregard
for whether the statements were true or false.

(C.T, 2782.)

Based on its finding of actual malice, the jury awarded Mr.
Khawar punitive damages in the amount of $500,000.

(C.T. 2791.)

"The question .whether the evidence in the record ... is
sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question

15

of law."

Bose, 466 U.S, at 510-511.

Therefore, this Court

should review all of the evidence on the issue of malice de
novo.
In order to be eligible for punitive damages, both public
figures and private individuals must satisfy the New York Times
actual malice requirement.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349,

The

Supreme Court has observed, however, that actual malice is a
difficult concept to encompass in one infallible definition.
See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968).

In New

York Times, the Court defined actual malice as publication of a
defamatory falsehood with "knowledge that it [is] false or with
reckless disregard of whether it [is] false or not."
at 279-280.

376 U.S.

The Court has equated reckless disregard of the

truth with a subjective awareness of probable falsity:

"There

must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubt as to the truth of
his publication."

St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.

Another court

held that "inaction, i.e., failure to investigate, which was a
product of a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of
facts that might confirm the probable falsity of charges will
support a finding of actual malice."

Antonovich v. Superior

Court, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1041, 1048 (1991).
As this Court recognized in Brown, private individuals have
less opportunity than public figures and public officials to

16

effectively counteract false statements, and are more vulnerable
to injury.

48 Cal. 3d at 744.

In order to effectively protect

private individuals from such injury, this Court should follow
the rationale of the court of appeal in Antonovich.

This Court

should find that Globe's failure to confirm the defamatory
allegations made in the article, as well as Globe's failure to
substantiate its alterations to Morrow's book, supports a
finding of actual malice.
A.

Globe Acted With Actual Malice Because Globe Had
Knowledge Of The Probable Falsity Of The Article And
Displayed A Reckless Disregard For The Truth.

This Court should follow the rationale of the Antonovich
court and find that Globe acted with actual malice because
Globe's deliberate decision not to investigate the defamatory
allegations implies a subjective awareness of probable falsity.
In Antonovich, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff, an
unsuccessful political opponent, removed or destroyed files
prior to vacating his office.

285 Cal. App. 3d at 1051.

The

plaintiff showed, however, that contrary to the allegations, the
defendant was aware that the files remained even after the
plaintiff vacated the office.

See id.

The court found that the

defendant's failure to investigate suggested that he lacked a
subjective good faith belief in the truth of his defamatory
allegations.

See id.

Similarly, this Court should find that

Globe's failure to investigate the veracity of the allegations
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contained in the article/ coupled with Globe s arbitrary
modifications to Morrow's book, amounts to a deliberate decision
not to confirm the probable falsity of the charges.
Like the defendant in Antonovich, Globe possessed an
awareness of the probable falsity of the defamatory allegations,
but made no attempt to investigate their veracity.

John

Blackburn, the author of the article, testified that he could
not recall whether anybody from Globe questioned the basis of
Morrow's allegations.

(R.T. 1132.)

John MeSweeney, an expert

witness for Mr. Khawar, testified that acceptable standards of
professional journalism dictate that when a news story makes
controversial accusations against an individual, the newspaper
must present a balanced story by providing the individual
accused with an opportunity to respond.

(R.T. 798.)

According

to Mr. MeSweeney, standards of professional journalism dictate
that "any story as sloppy as this is and as unbalanced as this
is and as vague about [its sources as this is]
discarded.

(R.T. 795.)

..." should be

Indeed, Robert Blair Kaiser, a

newspaper columnist, testified that Morrow's theory had "zero
credibility."

(R.T. 2152.)

made the whole thing up .

Mr. Kaiser stated:

"It seemed he

. . there was no evidence at all in

the book, and there was [aj lot[] of evidence outside the book,
from my own investigation, that Mr, Iqbal was never in the
Ambassador pantry during the shooting."
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(R.T. 2152.)

Moreover,

Globe's failure to investigate, despite the obvious bias and
i

flimsy factual foundation reflected in the article, indicates a
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statements.
Accordingly, this Court should find that Globe's failure to
investigate evidences a subjective awareness of the probable
falsity of the charges.
Globe's failure to investigate is further illustrated by
Blackburn's failure to make a good faith effort to contact Mr.
Khawar.

As discussed above, Globe should have made a good faith

attempt to both verify the allegations and provide Mr. Khawar
with an opportunity to respond.

(R.T. 798.)

Admittedly, there

was some confusion surrounding Mr. Khawar's true name: in the
Morrow book and the Globe article, Mr. Khawar is referred to as
"Ali Ahmand" and "Khalid Iqbal."

(R.T. 1123.)

The index to the

Morrow book identifies "Ali Ahmand" and "Khalid Iqbal" as being
the same person.

(R.T. 1123.)

As the record shows, however,

Blackburn could have located Mr. Khawar with only a few minutes
of investigation.

See Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 32.

At

trial, Blackburn testified that he "believed" he checked with
Los Angeles Directory Assistance and was told that there was no
"Ahmand" listing.

(R.T. 1121.)

Had Blackburn simply looked at

the index to the Morrow book and asked Los Angeles Directory
Assistance for an "Iqbal" listing, he would have reached a
relative of Mr. Khawar who would have informed Blackburn that
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Khalid Iqbal and Khalid Khawar were one and the same.
Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 32.

See

Blackburn's failure to perform

even these minor investigative steps falls far below acceptable
standards of professional journalism.

Thus, this Court should

find that Globe's publication of this biased article implies a
deliberate decision not to investigate facts that might confirm
the falsity of the charges.
Moreover, Globe's reckless disregard for the truth is
illustrated by Globe's modifications to Morrow's book.

A Globe

editor changed Morrow's job title from "CIA operative" in the
reporter's copy of the article to "CIA agent" in the published
news story.

(R.T. 1091.)

Mr. McSweeney testified that "calling

somebody a former CIA agent has a lot more impact to it than CIA
operative."

(R.T. 809.)

Globe's intentional publication of a

fact it knew to be false emphasizes Globe's reckless disregard
for the truth.

Thus, this Court should find that Globe acted

with actual malice.
Globe's claim that its sources were reliable is compromised
by the inconsistencies in Blackburn's testimony.

At trial, when

asked whether he had interviewed three key sources listed in
Morrow's book, Blackburn testified that he could not recall.
(R.T. 1140.)

Each source testified that he was not contacted by

anyone from Globe.

Khawar, 51 Cal. App. 4th at 32.

In

addition. Globe's apparent dissatisfaction with Morrow's
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pedigree (as a mere CIA operative) indicates a subjective lack
of good faith in Morrow's credibility.

This Court should find

that Globe's failure to contact key sources and its willingness
to falsify information indicates a reckless disregard for the
truth.
The evidence in the record more than supports the jury's
finding that Globe possessed actual malice.

The foregoing facts

emphasize Globe's awareness of the probable falsity of the
allegations and Globe's subsequent decision not to acquire
knowledge of facts that might confirm this falsity.

Blackburn's

failure to contact Mr. Khawar and other important sources
indicates a failure to investigate.

Globe's modification of

Morrow's book signifies a reckless disregard for the truth and
credibility of Globe's sources.

These facts underscore Globe's

deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of the facts that
would reveal the falsity of the charges.

Accordingly, this

Court should affirm the findings of the court below and hold
that the award of punitive damages was proper.
III. IN RECOGNITION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY RIGHTS, THIS COURT HAS
NOT ADOPTED, AND SHOULD NOT NOW ADOPT, THE NEUTRAL
REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE.
The neutral reportage privilege was established as a
defense to defamation liability by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.

S^ Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'v, Inc., 556 F.2d

113, 120 (1977).

The privilege has not yet been recognized as a
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Whether

legitimate defense by the United States Supreme Court

such privilege exists or not is a question of first impression
by this court, and should therefore be reviewed ^ novo.

This

Court "must make an independent examination of the whole record,
so as to assure [itself] that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."

New York

Times. 376 U.S. at 205.
Under the neutral reportage privilege, reporters can
republish fair and accurate reports of false, defamatory
statements, regardless of the reporter's subjective awareness of
the statements' falsity.

Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

In

Edwards, the court extended the First Amendment to the common
law privilege of fair report.^

See id.

The Edwards court

provided constitutional immunity to reporters of information
relevant to the public interest.

See id.

This decision,

however, ignores the equally important policy that one should
enjoy one's reputation, unimpaired by defamatory attacks.

In

recognition of this fundamental right to privacy, which Edwards
failed to address, one Supreme Court justice noted that, "the
right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our

^
The common law privilege of fair report was established as a
qualified protection for fair and accurate republishings of defamatory
statements made in public governmental meetings or in judicial
documents. See Rodney A, Nelson, Comment, Neutral Reportage: Making
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basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being

a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered

liberty."

Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)

(Stewart,

J., concurring).
The neutral reportage privilege has not been well received
by the courts.

See Ray Worthy Cambell, Note, The Developing

Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 Va. L. Rev. 853, 863 (1983).
Some courts have explicitly refused to adopt the privilege
because its newsworthiness requirement conflicts with the
Supreme Court's constitutional frameworlc for protecting freedom
of expression in defamation cases.^

See id.

This Court should

therefore consider the Supreme Court's lilcely rejection of the
neutral reportage privilege in reviewing whether or not to adopt
the privilege in California.
The Newsworthy Requirement Of The Neutral Reportage
Privilege Is Inconsistent With The United States
Supreme Court's Focus On The Status Of The Individual
Defamed.
In the seminal New York Times decision, the Supreme Court
first addressed the conflict between the public's interest in
the free exchange of information and an individual's interest in
being protected from defamation.

376 U.S. at 256.

The Court

a

S^ense of Edwards v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'V/ Inc.^ 20 Cap. U. L. Rev. 47i
(1991).
For the leading federal case rejecting the neutral reportage
rivilege based on the inconsistency of the newsworthy requirement
ith the Supreme Court decisions in Gertz and St. Amant, see Diclcev v.
CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221 (3rd Cir., 1978).

3
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held that in order to provide ''breathing space" for freedom of
expression, a public official must prove actual malice in order
to recover damages for defamation.

See i^ at 279-80.

The

court focused on the status of the public official in order to
determine if protection should have been granted under the First
Amendment.

id^

The Court's rationale in New York Times

thereby set the groundwork for affording constitutional
protection to defamation defendants based upon an examination of
the plaintiff's status.
Subsequent Supreme Court cases demonstrate that the Court
has consistently focused on the plaintiff's status in deciding
whether a defamatory publication is protected by the First
Amendment.

See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345-48; Firestone, 424 U.S,

at 157; Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166-69.

These cases repudiated a

First Amendment protection standard based on a newsworthiness
test.

This Court should reject the neutral reportage privilege

and follow the Supreme Court's constitutional analysis, focusing
on the status of the individual defamed and not the
newsworthiness of the allegation.
In Gertz, the defendant wrote a defamatory article about an
attorney who represented a police officer's family in a murder
trial.

418 U.S. at 326.

The Court rejected a subject matter

(or newsworthiness) analysis because it failed to sufficiently
protect the constitutional interest in a private person's
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reputation.

See id. at 345-46,

The Court thereby overruled its

previous decision in Rosenbloom.

See id.

Moreover, the Court

expressly refused to extend the actual malice requirement of New
York Times to defamatory falsehoods involving private
individuals, regardless of public interest in the subject
matter.

See id.

The Court followed its reasoning established

iri New York Times by reaffirming a status-based analysis and
overruling its previous decision to apply a newsworthy test.
The Court subsequently reaffirmed Gertz and again renounced
the subject matter test.

See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454.

In

Firestone, the plaintiff filed a defamation suit against Time,
Inc. for inaccurately reporting on her divorce proceedings.
at 452.

Id.

The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the

actual malice standard should apply because of the public's
interest in a divorce characterized as "cause celebre."
at 454.

See id.

The Court noted that it had repudiated the subject

matter test in Gertz in favor of a test that focused on the
plaintiff's status.

See id. at 455-56.

In its most recent rejection of the newsworthiness test,
the Court held that a private individual does not become a
public figure merely by becoming associated with a newsworthy
matter.

S^ Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167.

In Wolston, the

plaintiff was incorrectly identified as a Soviet agent after
failing to appear before a panel investigating Soviet spy
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activities.

See id. at 159, 162.

The Court rejected the

defendant's argument that the plaintiff was a public figure who
was required to prove that the defamation was made with actual
malice.

See id. at 165-68.

The Court applied its rationale

from Gert2 and held that "[a] libel defendant must show more
than mere newsworthiness to justify application of the demanding
burden of New York Times."

Id. at 167-68.

Thus, consistent

with its previous holdings, the Court once again rejected the
subject matter test.
"The Supreme Court has established a constitutional
framework for protecting freedom of expression in defamation
cases in which the standard of protection applied is determined
by the status of the person defamed." Dennis J. Dobbels,
Comment, Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.: A
Constitutional Privilege to Republish Defamation Should be
Rejected, 33 Hastings L-J. 1203, 1218 (1982).

This framework

preserves the constitutional balance between the public s
interest in freedom of expression and an individual's interest
in protecting his or her reputation.

In contrast, the Edwards

test, which was established one year after the Supreme Court's
explicit rejection of the newsworthiness standard in Firestone,
fails to effectively weigh these competing interests because it
only cursorily considers the status of the person defamed.
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This

Court should follow the framework adopted by the Supreme Court
I

and decline to adopt the neutral reportage privilege,
B.

I

The Neutral Reportage Privilege Is Inconsistent
With The California Constitution.

The expansive immunity provided by the neutral reportage
privilege runs contrary to California's Constitution, which
holds a person liable for irresponsible publication of
defamatory statements.

Following the Supreme Court's rationale,

this Court should refuse to adopt the privilege because it fails
to consider the delicate balance between societal and individual
constitutional rights.
The California Constitution states that "[e]very person may
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.

A law

may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."

Cal,

Const, art. I, § 2, subd.

(a).

Thus, California's Constitution

recognizes the principles of the First Amendment, but expressly
I

provides constitutional protections for an individual's
reputation.

See id.

This constitutional protection, coupled

with the necessity of imposing responsibility for the abuse of
I

the right of freedom of expression, should persuade this Court
to reject the adoption of the neutral reportage privilege in
California.
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In Edwards^ the Second Circuit created a standard that
immunizes a reporter from liability for defamation so long as
the defamatory statements are newsworthy and affect the public
welfare.

556 F.2d at 120.

The Edwards court concluded that the

public's interest in newsworthy information outweighs an
individual's interest in his or her reputation.
Hastings L.J. at 1210.

See Dobbels, 33

This analysis is not only inconsistent

with the Supreme Court's First Amendment framework, but it is
aj^so inconsistent with California's Constitution.

Accordingly,

this Court should reject adoption of the neutral reportage
privilege.
The California Constitution, like the Supreme Court in
Gertz, recognizes the importance of an individual's reputation,
as well as the value in holding the media responsible for
abusing the boundaries of freedom of expression.

As this Court

has observed, the California Constitution demands recognition of
the value of an individual's reputation.

See Brown, 48 Cal. 3d

at 727 (citing Cal. Const, art. I, § 2, subd.

(a)).

The neutral

reportage privilege only incidentally considers the
differentiation between public and private individuals'
reputations.

Consequently, extending the privilege to all

individuals without differentiating on the basis of status,
would prevent any person from recovering for a defamatory
statement republished by a media defendant, so long as the
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defamation was newsworthy.

Adoption of the neutral reportage

privilege in California would contradict this state's policy of
protecting an individual's reputation, a tenet recognized by
this Court in its previous holding in Brown.
C.

Extension Of The Neutral Reportage Privilege To
Private Individuals Is Inconsistent With Existing
Public Policy.

The neutral reportage privilege should not be adopted in
California.

If this Court were to adopt the privilege, however,

despite its shortcomings, this Court should find that the
privilege only extends to publications concerning public
figures.

Accordingly, because Mr. Khawar is a private figure,

this Court should find that the privilege is inapplicable in
this case.
This Court has held that "a publication or broadcast
by a member of the news media to the general public regarding a
private person is not privileged."

Brown, 48 Cal. 3d at 727.

In Brown, this Court rejected the public interest privilege
which provides immunity for publication of defamatory statements
relevant to the public interest.

See i^ at 756.

This Court

rejected the privilege because it granted overly-expansive
constitutional protections to the media and placed unjustifiably
severe limitations on private plaintiffs seeking recovery for
defamation.

See Id. at 721, 744 .

Although in Brown this Court

applied the public interest privilege, rather than the neutral
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reportage privilege, an analogy is appropriate because both
doctrines seek to expand constitutional protections for the
media.

Like the public interest test rejected in Bro^,

Edwards' neutral reportage privilege undermines the
constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights of private
individuals and should likewise be rejected.
Moreover, as this Court has noted, "private individuals
have less opportunity than public officials and public figures
to effectively counteract false statements and are more
vulnerable to injury."

Id^ at 744.

The Supreme Court has also

noted that private individuals have
relinquished no part of [their] interest in the protection
of [their] own good name, and consequently [they have] a
more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury
inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private
individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than
public officials and public figures; they are also more
deserving of recovery.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.

Accordingly, to protect private

individuals from injury, this Court should not adopt the neutral
reportage privilege.
Significant social values fundamental to the law of
defamation also support the preclusion of the neutral reportage
privilege to private individuals.

"Society has a pervasive and

strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
reputation."

Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86.

As Justice Stevens

commented, "[t]he destruction that defamatory falsehood can
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bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to
redeem.

Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is

the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man
whose reputation has been falsely dishonored."

Id. at 93-94.

Eliminating the ability of victims of defamation to seek legal
redress would be contrary to the spirit of the United States and
California Constitutions.

Accordingly, even if this Court

adopts the neutral reportage privilege in California, public
policy and the constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights of
individuals should bar the extension of the privilege to private
figures.
D.

Even The Court That Created The Neutral
Reportage Privilege Has Noted That The Privilege
Should Be Narrowly Construed.

Subsequent to its ruling that public interest in newsworthy
information may outweigh a private individual's right to an
unsullied reputation, the Second Circuit revisited the neutral
reportage issue and limited the scope of the protection it
conferred.

S^ Cianci v. New Times Publ'q Co., 639 F.2d 54, 69

(2d Cir. 1980).

This Court, like the Second Circuit, should

recognize the doctrinal uncertainty created by the neutral
reportage privilege, and refuse to apply such an expansive media
protection to this state.
In Cianci, the defendant reported that the mayor of
Providence, Rhode Island had been accused of raping a woman who
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agreed to drop the charges following a $3,000 settlement.
id. at 56.

Although the story did report that the mayor denied

the charge, it did not contain his version of the facts.
id. at 69.

See

See

The Second Circuit noted that "[w]hile the Supreme

Court has not yet addressed the question of the existence of a
constitutional privilege of neutral reportage,

.

.

. this

circuit is on record that the media enjoy such a privilege with
respect to public officials or figures."

Id. at 67,

The court

further noted that "the precise bounds of the privilege remain
to be delineated."

Id. at 69.

The court then espoused a narrow

construction of the privilege, stating that the Edwards opinion
"did contain important suggestions that the privilege was
limited in scope and required careful examination of the facts
in each case."

Id. at 68,

The court agreed that the mayor was

a public figure, but found that, unlike the defendant in
Edwards, the magazine had failed to take a neutral stance on the
allegations.

See id. at 69.

The court concluded, "[t]he need

for the careful limitation of a constitutional privilege for
fair reportage is demonstrated by the breadth of the defense,
which confers immunity even for publishing statements believed
to be untrue."

id.

Accordingly, this Court should not adopt a

privilege that its creators believe to be limited in scope and
application.
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IV.
I

EVEN IF THIS COURT ADOPTS THE NEUTRAL REPORTAGE
PRIVILEGE, IT IS NOT A DEFENSE FOR GLOBE'S CONDUCT IN THIS
CASE.
Four necessary elements must be demonstrated to establish

the neutral reportage privilege as delineated in Edwards:

(1}

the charges must be newsworthy and must create or be associated
with a public controversy;

(2) the charges must be made by a

responsible and prominent source;

(3) the charges must be

reported neutrally and accurately; and (4) the charges must be
made about a public official or public figure.
F.2d at 120.

See Edwards, 556

Even if this Court adopts the neutral reportage

privilege, Globe cannot meet this burden.

Accordingly, this

Court should deny Globe a neutral reportage privilege defense
and find Globe liable for defamation against Mr. Khawar.
^•

Globe Has Not Satisfied the Neutral Reportage
Privilege Requirement That The Allegations Against Mr.
Khawar Be Both Newsworthy And Associated With A Public
Controversy.

The neutral reportage privilege requires that the
allegations made against a defamation plaintiff be newsworthy
and be associated with a public controversy.
F.2d at 120.
I

See Edwards, 556

The allegation that Mr. Khawar was part of a

completely unsubstantiated conspiracy to assassinate Senator
Kennedy is not newsworthy.

John McSweeney, a forty year veteran

of the news business, testified that he would not consider
Morrow's theory to be newsworthy because the assassination
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occurred more than twenty years ago.

(R.T, 868, 861,)

Furthermore, Globe published the article almost six months after
Roundtable distributed Morrow's book.

(C.T. 138-39.)

If

Morrow's theory were truly newsworthy, surely Globe would have
published a report on it immediately, rather than waiting six
months.

Globe's delay suggests that it used the article as a

filler.

Moreover, "a constitutional privilege of neutral

reportage is not created

. .

. merely because an individual

newspaper . . . decides that a particular statement is
newsworthy."
1978).

Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Cir.

Accordingly, this Court should find that the article

fails to satisfy the first requirement of the neutral reportage
privilege.
There is no existing public controversy surrounding Mr.
Khawar's role in Senator Kennedy's assassination.

Though a

legitimate public controversy may arise if new evidence
surfaces, the allegations made against Mr. Khawar were not
substantiated by any evidence.

(R.T. 2152.)

One expert

testified that his investigations led him to the conclusion that
absolutely no evidence existed to support the allegations made
against Mr. Khawar.

(R.T. 2152.)

Moreover, the assassination

and the ensuing controversy occurred in 1963, more than twenty
years prior to Globe's article.

Additionally, a man named

Sirhan Sirhan has been convicted of the assassination.

The fact

that Mr. Khawar could not have been the true assassin is
corroborated by Robert A. Houghton, the chief detective
supervising the investigation of Senator Kennedy's
assassination.

Mr. Houghton testified that based on a video of

the assassination, and on an analysis of Mr. Khawar's physical
location surrounding the assassination, it is impossible that
Mr. Khawar could have been in the area when and where Senator
Kennedy was shot.

(R.T. 950-56.)

Accordingly, this Court

should find that Globe did not print a newsworthy charge about
an existing public controversy when it printed Morrow's theory.
B-

Globe Has Not Satisfied The Neutral Reportage
Privilege Requirement That The Allegations Be Made By
A Responsible And Prominent Source.

The neutral reportage privilege requires that allegations
made against a defamation plaintiff stem from a responsible and
prominent source.

S^ Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

not be considered a prominent source.

Morrow should

Robert Blair Kaiser, a

columnist and author of a book chronicling the assassination of
Senator Kennedy, testified that he was "incredulous" because he
thought that Morrow was simply not "playing with a full deck"
and had "zero credibility."

(R.T. 2151-52.)

Mr. Kaiser stated

that Morrow had no real evidence to support his hypothesis that
Mr. Khawar shot Senator Kennedy.

(R.T. 2152.)

Mr. Kaiser also

testified that the evidence from his own investigation showed
that Mr. Khawar was never in the pantry area during Senator
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Kennedy's assassination.

(R.T. 2152.)

Globe's distribution of

more than two and a half million copies of an article based on
Morrow's discreditable theories cannot be justified.

1861.)

(R.T.

Morrow irresponsibly charged Mr. Khawar with the

assassination of Senator Kennedy/ despite a lack of evidence
proving the allegations.

Accordingly, this Court should find

that unsubstantiated allegations directed at Mr. Khawar do not
make Morrow a responsible source.
C.

Globe Has Not Satisfied The Neutral Reporta^
Privilege Requirement That The Allegations Be Reported
Neutrally And Accurately.

The neutral reportage privilege requires that allegations
made against a defamation plaintiff be reported neutrally and
accurately.

See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

Globe's allegation

that Mr. Khawar assassinated Senator Kennedy is reported neither
neutrally nor accurately.

John Blackburn, the author of the

Globe article, failed to make a good faith attempt to contact
Mr. Khawar and investigate Morrow's charges, thereby publishing
a biased and inaccurate item.

Accordingly, Globe fails to meet

the third requirement of the neutral reportage privilege.
1.

Globe neglected to follow customary industry
practices to ensure the accuracy of its article.

Blackburn did not adhere to the established code of conduct
for journalists.

According to the Statement of Principles of

the American Society of Newspaper Editors,
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"[e]very effort must

be made to assure that the news content is accurate.”

Brown,

48

Cal. 3d at 732 (quoting Swain, Reporter's Ethics (1978) p.ll2).
In Brown, this Court quoted the Code of Ethics of Sigma Delta
Chi, The Society of Professional Journalists, and reaffirmed the
standard that "there is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of
thoroughness.”

Id.

Globe's failure to follow industry

standards should preclude a finding that the article was neutral
and accurate.
Several expert witnesses testified that Blackburn ignored
the tenets of professional journalism when writing the Globe
article.

Mr. McSweeney, a veteran of the news business, stated

that Blackburn's article had little basis to it.

(R.T. 795.)

He further testified that the article was "sloppy,”
"unbalanced," "vague about the attribution" and falls below the
standards of the industry.

(R.T. 831.)

Mr. McSweeney

additionally stated that in accordance with respectable industry
practices, Blackburn should have made a diligent effort to
interview Mr. Khawar and offer him the opportunity to refute the
charges.

(R.T. 872-75.); see also, Cianci, 639 F.2d at 69.

Instead, Blackburn accused Mr. Khawar of a serious crime and
then "[left him] hanging out there to dry."

(R.T. 071.)

Blackburn made only one phone call to Los Angeles Directory
Assistance, asking for the number of Ali Ahmand.
22.)

(R.T. 1121-

Had Blackburn followed conventional journalistic
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practices, he could have found Mr. Khawar by asking for the
number of Khalid Iqbal, Mr. Khawar's name according to Pakistani
custom, and the other name Morrow used to identify Mr. Khawar in
the index of his book.

(R.T. 1383; 1122.)

Moreover, Blackburn

could have called the head of the assassination investigation,
Mr. Houghton, to verify Morrow's allegations.

Mr. Houghton,

however, testified that he never received any investigative
calls from anyone at Globe.

(R.T. 957.)

Even the trial judge found that Globe's article was biased
and inaccurate.

(R.T. 2740.)

The trial judge noted that

although it is impossible to identify Mr. Khawar in the
photographs in Morrow's book, by retouching, lightening and
increasing the size of the same photos. Globe created an image
to finger Mr. Khawar, without cause, as the assassin of Senator
Kennedy.

(R.T. 2742-44.)

Thus, Blackburn's failure to follow

the code of ethics established for all journalists resulted in a
biased and inaccurate report of Morrow's charges against Mr.
Khawar.

Accordingly, this Court should hold Globe to industry

practices and find that it failed to produce an neutral and
accurate article.
2.

Republication of a defamatory statement
orioinallv made by another is not a defense to
liability.

This Court should reject Globe's claim that it is not
liable to Mr. Khawar merely because it republished Morrow's

«
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conspiracy theories and was not, therefore, the original
publisher of the libelous statements.

"American courts have

traditionally refused to distinguish between publishers and
republishers of defamatory statements, on the theory that 'tale
bearers are as bad as tale makers.'"

Barry v. Time, Inc.,

584 F. Supp. 1110, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 1984)

(quoting McDonald v.

Glitsch, Inc., 589 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)).
Globe's unverified republication of Morrow's conspiracy theory
does not immunize Globe from liability for breaching
constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights.

Accordingly, this

Court should find that Globe cannot shield itself from liability
merely because it was not the original publisher of the
defamatory statements.
D.

Globe Has Not Satisfied The Final Requirement Of
The Neutral Reportage Privilege That The
Allegations Concern A Public Official Or Public
Figure.

The neutral reportage privilege requires that the
defamatory allegations be made against a public official or
public figure.

Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.

Because Mr.

Khawar is a private figure, any assertion of the neutral
reportage privilege is inappropriate.

Accordingly, the court

below properly held that Globe is precluded from asserting a
defense of neutral reportage privilege.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the lower court's finding that Mr.
Khawar is a private figure.

His mere association with the

assassination did not elevate him to public figure status.
Moreover, Mr. Khawar provided substantial evidence to support
the jury's finding of actual malice.

Thus, this Court should

affirm the award of punitive damages in Mr. Khawar's favor.
This Court should not adopt the neutral reportage privilege
because it is inconsistent with constitutional protections for
defamation plaintiffs.

If this Court does adopt the neutral

reportage privilege, however, this Court should affirm the
holding of the court below and find that Globe's failure to meet
the privilege's requirements bars the assertion of the
privilege.
For the foregoing reasons, the lower court's decision
should be affirmed.

Dated:

Respectfully Submitted,

October 28, 1997

Counsel for Respondent
Mr. Khalid Khawar
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